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Book Reviews 
When Killing is Wrong: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Courts, 
by Arthur 1. Dyck (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press 2001) 
Arthur J. Dyck's new book, When Killing is Wrong: Physician-Assisted 
Suicide and the Courts, is a valuable addition to the literature on physician-
assisted suicide. In this short book (127 pages), Dyck discusses the 
"conflicting modes of moral argumentation" that are present in the debate 
about the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. He vigorously defends 
the sanctity of life ethic and critiques the contemporary assault on this ethic 
in recent judicial opinions and in the works of certain modem 
philosophers. Despite some flaws, which are discussed below, I think this 
book is well worth reading. 
The book focuses narrowly on Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco 
v. Quill, the 1997 Supreme Court decisions rejecting the claim that laws 
banning assisted suicide violate the Constitution. Dyck discusses the key 
lower court opinions in these cases and then finally discusses the key 
Supreme Court opinions. Dyck, who is the Mary B. Saltonsall Professor of 
Population Ethics in the School of Public Health and a member of the 
Divinity School faculty at Harvard University, is not a legal scholar. His 
treatment of these cases focuses not so much on the legal doctrine or on 
constitutional interpretation or on the proper role of judicial review in our 
society, but rather on the moral frameworks that are implicit in the varying 
judicial approaches to assisted suicide. 
His analysis critiques, from a philosophical perspective, the moral 
theories and the underlying theological anthropology expressed by those 
who support a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. According 
to Dyck, the physician-assisted suicide position "would leave homicide 
law without a principled basis." (p. 8.) "[T]here is [, then,] an urgent need 
to examine carefully what philosophical justification exists for the 
principles that now guide and support homicide law." (Id.) His "book 
intends to provide such a justification." (Id.) He considers, accordingly, 
"what makes killing wrong, when it is [wrong] , and what moral and legal 
concepts will provide a principled basis for homicide laws" and also for 
laws banning assisted suicide. (p. 7.) 
In this discussion, Dyck discusses three traditions that he claims are 
vying for ascendancy in American law. First, is the tradition rooted in 
Judaism and Christianity. Second, is the tradition rooted in Hobbes. Third, 
is the tradition that is traced to a particular reading of the thought of John 
Stuart Mill. In Dyck's account, the first two traditions combined to create a 
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"Natural Rights Synthesis" that provides a rationale for modern Western 
democracies and for their long-standing protection for the right to life and 
their opposition to direct killing. In contrast, the third tradition appeals to 
utility as the basis for rights. This tradition, which he contends has emerged 
in recent court decisions favoring assisted suicide, does not provide a basis 
for retaining the Anglo-American legal traditions' affirmation of the right 
to life. Dyck maintains that this rupture with the long-standing premises of 
our legal and moral traditions threatens "the protection of life and liberty 
necessary to perpetuating communal life ... . " (p. 13.) 
The way out of this situation, according to Dyck, is to emphasize the 
elements in the Millian tradition that are supportive of the traditional ethic 
and to incorporate these elements with the Natural Rights Synthesis into a 
new synthesis. This new synthesis would avoid the theological conflicts 
implicit in these varying traditions while providing support for a view of 
the sacredness of human life "such that the law reflects, teaches, and 
supports the incalculable worth of the life of each individual." (p; 119.) 
As noted, much of this book is a detailed review of the moral 
reasoning that is either explicit or implicit in court opinions on physician-
assisted suicide. Most of this analysis is full of insights into what is really 
at stake in these opinions. The debates in these cases are not simply about 
fine points of legal doctrine; they reflect rather a deep divide about human 
nature, about the meaning of freedom, about the value of human life, and 
about the nature of moral reasoning. 
Of special value is Dyck's focus on the communal aspects of this 
controversy. (Dyck's earlier book, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: 
The Moral Bonds of Community (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press 1994), explored 
this aspect of rights in great detail.) He does emphasize that the intentional 
killing of an innocent person is wrong because "it violates an individual's 
natural and inalienable right to life and all the expectations and claims it 
makes on human behavior." (p. 96.) But, he is particularly persuasive in 
explaining how "the act of killing oneself or someone else violates and 
threatens to undermine the mutual moral responsibilities that are requisites 
of individual and communal life." (Id.) This is a welcome corrective to the 
more typical discussions of these issues with their exaggerated emphasis 
on individual autonomy. 
There are some weaknesses in this book. First, I found it striking that 
there is almost no mention of abortion in thi s book. His entire legal and 
moral discussion of physician-assisted suicide is completely detached from 
its connection to abortion. I realize that physician-assisted suicide is a 
weighty enough topic of its own, but I think it is impossible to provide a 
well-rounded picture of the court decisions and the underlying philosophy 
these decisions express without exploring the linkage with abortion. There 
is, for example, just one brief mention in Dyck's book of the Supreme 
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Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). This is a real 
puzzle given how prominent a role that decision played in subsequent 
judicial treatments of physician-assisted suicide. 
Second, I found inadequate Dyck's treatment of the relationship 
between physician-assisted suicide and the refusal of life-sustaining 
medical treatment. This is a central portion of the book. Dyck largely 
defends Chief Justice's Rehnquist's conclusion in the 1997 assisted suicide 
cases that "[t]he distinction between letting a patient die and making that 
patient die is important, logical, rational, and well established." Most of 
Dyck's discussion of this issue is sound, yet I found it to be troubling in 
some significant respects. He defends the permissibility of what he terms 
"comfort-only care" even when this care clearly hastens death. I agree that 
there is a case to be made for this distinction, but it depends greatly on how 
one defines "comfort-only care." At one point (p. 38) he seems to equate 
"comfort-only care" with passive euthanasia, and I don't think he 
adequately treats just how threatening an acceptance of passive euthanasia 
is to what I take to be the thrust of the whole book- that is, to defend the 
sanctity of life, or as Dyck sometimes describes the matter, the incalculable 
worth ofthe life of each individual. And, I don't think he adequately comes 
to grip with the reality that many of the "refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment" cases in the courts really do accept the permissibility of lethal 
choices and an acceptance of the idea that some lives are not worth 
living-concepts that Dyck effectively criticizes in the rest of the book. 
In the end, reading this book left me uncertain how Dyck would 
handle the withdrawal of food and water cases. (He has criticized the 
withdrawal of food and water from patients in a persistent vegetative state 
in earlier writings.) His principles seem sound (he does seem to focus on 
the important point that the issue in these cases involves determining 
whether the treatment is burdensome, not whether the patient's life is a 
burden), but he does not explore at all the threat that these cases truly 
represent. Because this book is characterized by much clear thinking, I 
found this ambiguity striking. (I have discussed the food and water cases in 
some detail in a recent article. See Richard S. Myers, "Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: A Current Legal Perspective," 1 National Catholic Bioethics 
Quarterly 345,356-361 (2001).) 
Third, I thought it a bit odd that his treatment reflects no real 
engagement with Catholic thought on these issues. Dyck is not a Catholic 
[I don't think], and he tries to put theological issues to one side, but I think 
it would have enriched the book if -he had discussed, for example, the 
thought of Pope John Paul II as expressed in Veritatis Splendor and 
Evangelium Vitae. No one has written more eloquently or persuasively on 
the clash between the culture of life and the culture of death than Pope 
178 Linacre Quarterly 
John Paul II, and so it is , I think, a significant omission to leave him out of 
the discussion altogether. 
Fourth, I thought that Dyck's discussion was disengaged from the 
broader cultural forces in play. He seems to reflect some confidence that 
his new synthesis will work us out of the problems that we are facing in 
this area. The tone at times almost seems to reflect the belief that we can 
solve these problems if we just clarify our thinking. I think he understates 
the extent to which the culture of death has been institutionalized in our 
culture (maybe this is due to his neglect of abortion), and that the long-term 
battle is really spiritual, and not just legal or moral. 
On the whole, however, Dyck's short book is worth reading. I think, 
in particular, that his more communal understanding of human rights is 
valuable. As he notes, "[h]uman rights become actual only through actions, 
patterns of behavior, and social arrangements that render their actualization 
possible." (p. 91.) And, as he also notes, it is essential that our "law reflects, 
teaches, and supports the incalculable worth of the life of each individual." 
(p. 119.) 
- Richard S. Myers, 
Professor of Law, 
Ave Maria School of Law. 
The Healer's Calling: A Spirituality for Physicians and Other Health Care 
Professionals by Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.EM., M.D., (New YorkIMahwah, 
N.J.: Paulist Press, 1997) 135 pages, paperback, $11.95 
Sulmasy, a Franciscan brother and a physician, writes that his book 
evolved from a retreat he gave for physicians. The material comes from his 
experience of being a Christian who works as a health care professional. 
The book should be understood "as a series of reflections on the lived 
spiritual experience of one Christian health care professional, asking where 
God is to be found in the work of health care, and asking where a person 
who purports to be a follower of Jesus of Nazareth can lay claim to the 
work of health care in the name of the kingdom of God."(p. 3) 
Sulmasy senses a malaise among health care professionals that is 
partly, if not wholly, a spiritual affair. While medicine is able to do more 
and more for the patient, health care professionals are taking less 
satisfaction from their work. Status, money, vacation time are not enough 
to motivate the hard work of these professionals. Clinical work itself will 
not cover the sense of despair and frustration. While repairing a damaged 
patient does bring a certain amount of joy and satisfaction, it is not enough 
to satisfy one's longings. Only the pursuit of one's ultimate end, union with 
God, will quench human longings. 
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